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 Numerous research studies have offered evidence that I-sharing (perceived 
subjective similarity) facilitates interpersonal connection (e.g. Huneke & Pinel, 2016; 
Pinel, Long, Landau, Alexander, & Pyszczynski, 2006; Pinel & Long, 2012).  Despite 
this research, no interventions currently exist to foster I-sharing between individuals, 
thereby leaving interventionists and others unable to utilize I-sharing to nurture authentic 
connections.  The current dissertation takes an important step in the direction of 
developing usable interventions based on I-sharing research.  Specifically, I examine the 
effectiveness of a technique designed to foster I-sharing genuinely between individuals.  
Building on I-sharing theory, which specifies that people most confidently believe that 
they I-share when they react simultaneously and identically to the same stimulus (Pinel et 
al., 2006), I randomly assigned participants either to experience novel, emotionally-
arousing stimuli that provoke predictable reactions in a context in which participants 
could also experience each other’s in-the-moment subjective experiences (the Fostered I-
sharing condition), or in a condition in which they could not fully experience each other’s 
experiences (the comparison condition).  To investigate whether I-sharing also proves 
effective for people who see themselves as dissimilar on an important self dimension, I 
also manipulated perceived value similarity of the other participant prior to the I-sharing 
intervention.  Participants either learned of an unshared value, learned of a shared value, 
or did not receive any value information.  Results showed that the I-sharing intervention 
significantly increased feelings of subjective similarity, but only increased liking and 
interpersonal behavior when participants also initially learned that they shared a similar 
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Figure 1: Conditional Effect of the I-sharing Manipulation on Perceived Subjective 




MAKING I-CONTACT: FOSTERING SHARED, IN-THE-MOMENT SUBJECTIVE 
EXPERIENCES 
 
"When we establish human connections within the context of shared experience we 
create community wherever we go.”  
― Gina Greenlee  
 
"The magic of film isn't just because of the big screen, or the acoustics, but the ineffable 
shared experience of going to the movies." 
― Fernando Perez 
 
When a person believes his or her in-the-moment subjective experience mirrors 
another person’s in-the-moment subjective experience, one can say that he or she I-
shares with the other person (Pinel, Long, Landau, Alexander, & Pyszczynski, 2006).  
Over the past decade, dozens of studies have shown that I-sharing fosters positive 
interpersonal outcomes.  Research suggests that I-sharing facilitates liking (Pinel, Long, 
Landau, & Pyszczynski, 2004; Pinel et al., 2006), bridges ingroup/outgroup divides 
(Pinel & Long, 2012), provides an immunization against conformity pressures (Pinel, 
Long, & Crimin, 2010), combats the tendency for individuals to see outgroup members as 
less than human (Pinel, Yawger, Long, Brenna, Rampy, & Finnell, 2017), and fosters 
selflessness (Huneke & Pinel, 2016).   
Given the potential for I-sharing to better people’s lives, individuals and society 
would benefit from the development of interventions that foster I-sharing between 
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individuals.  Although research data have provided us with a growing understanding of 
the consequences of I-sharing, little research has explicitly considered its antecedents.  
What fosters genuine I-sharing between individuals?  In service to internal validity, 
almost all of the previous techniques researchers used to examine I-sharing used 
fabricated responses from a bogus ostensible other to manipulate systematically whether 
participants thought another person I-shared with them.  This created the environment 
necessary to study I-sharing from a basic science perspective.  Now that we know – 
thanks to data generated by these controlled laboratory experiments – what good I-
sharing can accomplish, we can shift our research attention to developing techniques that 
can help us move I-sharing work from the lab to a more applied setting, where it has the 
potential to do the most good.   
The current dissertation examines the effectiveness of a technique designed to 
foster I-sharing between individuals.  Specifically, this technique consists of having 
people simultaneously experience together novel, emotionally-arousing stimuli that 
provoke predictable reactions in a context where they can infer each other’s experience.  
In what follows, I lay out the reasoning behind the technique, and the framework for 
testing it.  First, I define and discuss the origins of I-sharing.  Next, I review the research 
methods previously used to manipulate I-sharing, and some of the key findings from I-
sharing research.  I then discuss the factors that influence inferences of I-sharing, and I 
introduce the I-sharing fostering technique tested here.  
The Constructs of I-sharing and Me-sharing 
The concepts of I-sharing and Me-sharing stem from an expansion of William 
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James’ (1890/1918) notions of the “Me” and “I” (Pinel et al., 2006).  James (1890/1918) 
discusses how one might separate the self into the Me, or objective self, and the I, or 
subjective self.  According to James, the Me is the self-concept, the self-as-object, the 
known.  It is the part of oneself that encompasses what one thinks when one looks upon 
oneself, everything one knows about oneself.  This includes, for instance, one’s political 
party affiliation, one’s race, and one’s hometown.  Anything stable and declarable one 
thinks about oneself represents an aspect of the Me.  James (1890/1918) distinguishes the 
Me from the I, which encompasses the agentic part of the self that actually experiences 
reality.  It is the knower, the self-as-subject (Pinel et al., 2006).   The I refers to the 
passing states of consciousness that change from second to second as one’s experience of 
reality changes. 
Pinel and colleagues (Pinel, Long, & Crimin, 2008) have often made an analogy 
to a mirror to illustrate the difference between the I and Me.  When looking in the mirror, 
all of what one sees in that mirror (e.g., the color of one’s skin and hair, whether one is 
tall or short, whether one has small or big teeth) represent aspects of the Me.  The actual 
experience of that image, though, the fear that one might soon be getting gray hair, the 
relief that a large pimple is disappearing, or the questioning of whether one actually 
really does look like a famous celebrity, represents the in-the-moment experience, the I.  
The I changes from second to second as the experience of the person changes, whereas 
the Me remains relatively constant.   
When people believe they share aspects of the objective self (the Me) in common 
(such as both being African-American, both being Republicans, or both being veterans) 
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one can say that they Me-share (Pinel et al., 2006).  On the other hand, one can say that 
two individuals I-share when they believe that they share the same subjective experience, 
i.e., when they believe their ‘I’s overlap (Pinel et al., 2006).  Although one can infer I-
sharing from a variety of cues, Pinel and colleagues (Pinel et al., 2006; Pinel, Long, & 
Huneke, 2015) have suggested that the most foolproof cue that one has I-shared with 
another occurs when two people have a simultaneous and identical reaction to the same 
stimulus.  This can occur, for instance, when two people both shiver from the same cold 
wind, offer the same silly response to an absurd question, or laugh at the fact that they 
both cannot stop laughing.  In line with this perspective, research does indeed show that 
response delays reduce the influence of I-sharing, but not of Me-sharing (Pinel, Long, & 
Huneke, 2015).    
Theory and research suggests that much of I-sharing’s influence stems from its 
ability to combat existential isolation, a loneliness arising from the fact that individuals 
cannot ever fully experience the world through the same phenomenological lens as 
another (Pinel et al., 2006; Pinel, Long, Murdoch, & Helm, 2017; Yalom, 1980).   In a 
reality full of existentially isolated individuals, I-sharing helps to bridge these 
experiential rifts, and thus alleviate existential isolation fears.  Supporting this reasoning, 
Pinel and colleagues (2006) showed that I-sharing had the most positive interpersonal 
effects on participants whom researchers manipulated to feel existentially isolated.  By 
relieving this existential isolation, Pinel and colleagues (2006, 2017) have argued, I-




Although disentangling I-sharing from Me-sharing at times can be difficult given 
the abstract nature of the I and Me, for basic research purposes it is vitally important.  As 
I-sharing and Me-sharing inferences correlate to a degree (see Pinel, Johnson, & Long, 
2017), researchers conducting basic research have made a concerted effort to disentangle 
them to fully discern whether similarity effects can be attributed to inferring a shared I, a 
shared Me, or both.  To accomplish this, I-sharing researchers have thus focused mainly 
on manipulating, over a computer, the supposed responses of another ostensible 
participant (Huneke & Pinel, 2016; Pinel & Long, 2012; Pinel, Long, & Huneke, 2015).  
Although no other person usually exists, participants believe one does.  The computer 
leads participants to believe the other person separately chooses similar or dissimilar 
answers to participants’ own answers.  These questions pertain to I-implicating, in-the-
moment experiences of novel stimuli (such as gut-level responses to inkblots or 
imagining celebrities as objects), and/or Me-implicating, stable aspects of the self that 
participants have almost certainly thought about before and incorporated into their self-
concepts (such as beliefs, values, or demographic differences).  By systematically 
manipulating these criteria researchers can thus disentangle I-sharing from Me-sharing.   
The guarantee of similarity or dissimilarity of responses in the manipulations of I-
sharing also has an added benefit of reducing noise in these experiments by largely 
ensuring inferences of I-sharing.  Although interventionists can carefully choose stimuli 
that individuals will likely react similarly to, some variation of response will always still 
exist, and thus interventionists can never fully ensure I-sharing.  For basic research 
purposes, researchers have thus chosen to manipulate feedback to ensure similarity of 
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response and to create the conditions under which one can best study I-sharing 
systematically.  Indeed they have showcased I-sharing’s potency in establishing a host of 
positive interpersonal outcomes (Huneke & Pinel, 2016; Pinel et al., 2006; Pinel & Long, 
2012).   
For instance, research shows that although both I-sharing and Me-sharing can 
increase reported liking of another, only I-sharing increases how much of a desired good 
participants anonymously give to another (Huneke & Pinel, 2016).  Similarly, although 
people might report equal levels of liking for a belief sharer (an important aspect of the 
Me) and I-sharer, people only show increased helping intentions toward the I-sharer 
(Huneke & Pinel, 2016).  In terms of outgroup members, Pinel and Long (2012) have 
shown that I-sharing improves liking and increases the likelihood that one would interact 
with a number of salient outgroup members, such as people of a different gender, race, or 
sexual orientation.  I-sharing’s effect in such cases overshadows and negates the robust 
tendency for people to favor ingroup members (Pinel & Long, 2012).  I-sharing can also 
help people find the courage to voice disagreement with other individuals who are all 
making blatantly incorrect judgments.  Research shows, for instance, that, after I-sharing, 
people feel more comfortable not conforming to an obviously wrong line assessment 
provided by others (Pinel, Long, & Crimin, 2010). 
Given all of the positive effects of I-sharing, it stands to reason that society would 
profit from fostering I-sharing between individuals in many situations.  Society and 
interventionists cannot, however, successfully use the previously used manipulations in 
the real world to foster I-sharing as neither the feedback, nor often the other participants, 
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are real.  Now that we know possibilities offered by I-sharing, it is important for 
researchers to develop and experimentally test techniques that can readily facilitate I-
sharing between individuals, techniques that do not rely on false feedback, or bogus 
others.  Without creating and testing such manipulations, one can never foster I-sharing 
between two real individuals, thereby neglecting one of the largest impacts I-sharing can 
have – creating genuine connections.   
On Fostering I-sharing 
Given the positive effects of I-sharing, researchers have theorized that fostering I-
sharing in a number of settings would increase the chances of beneficial outcomes.  
Researchers have suggested, for instance, that fostering I-sharing would be beneficial in: 
(1) inspiring people to act more selflessly towards one another in a work setting (Huneke 
& Pinel, 2016); (2) helping foster a strong therapeutic alliance between therapist and 
client (Pinel, Bernecker, & Rampy, 2015); (3) helping couples in therapy to reconnect 
(Pinel, Bernecker, & Rampy, 2015); (4) helping individuals overcome racial prejudices 
(Pinel & Long, 2012; Gaither, Remedios, Schultz, Maddox, & Sommers, 2016); (5) 
fostering more inclusive behavior toward stigmatized others (Pinel et al., 2016); and (6) 
helping people resolve conflict (Pinel, 2011).  In addition to these, countless other 
situations exist where fostering I-sharing might have beneficial outcomes, including 
helping children who are not getting along start to see each other’s perspectives, or 
improving the increasingly strained relationship between police officers and outgroup 
community members.    
As bridging situations of difference comprise many of the previously theorized 
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applications of I-sharing, interventionists interested in potentially using an I-sharing 
intervention should test any intervention in such a difference situation as well.  Can one 
use I-sharing to help overcome disagreements and differences?   
Many of these disagreements may stem from differences in the ‘Me’ (such as 
coming from different backgrounds, or holding different beliefs).  Establishing I-sharing 
experiences in such circumstances could help bridge these ‘Me’ divides as these divides 
might damage relationships in part by hampering moments of I-sharing (Allport, 1979; 
Long, 2007).  Restoring those I-sharing connections could thus improve those 
relationships.  Research, for example, both shows that individuals can dislike others 
based solely on these differences in the ‘Me’ (Allport, 1979), and that individuals may 
lessen potential moments of I–sharing with those they dislike by avoiding experiencing 
the same stimuli (Long, 2007).  Long (2007), for instance, showed that participants made 
to dislike a target through ostensible negative feedback, when given a choice of foods to 
eat, avoided choosing to eat the same food the target chose to eat significantly more than 
random chance would suggest.    As experimental I-sharing research shows that I-sharing 
can help connect individuals who differ in regards to aspects of the Me (Pinel and Long, 
2012), creating a manipulation that forces individuals to experience the same stimuli may 
help to facilitate I-sharing, and help facilitate interpersonal connection even in situations 
of dislike.  Researchers testing an I-sharing intervention should thus test two competing 
hypotheses – the hypothesis that important Me differences will negate the effectiveness 
of any specific I-sharing intervention versus the hypothesis that the I-sharing intervention 
will help overcome those differences.  
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To be truly useful, an I-sharing intervention needs to be short, effective, easy to 
use, testable, and able to be used in a variety of settings.  Brief motivational interviewing 
interventions represent one example of an intervention that succeeds on these dimensions 
(Bien, Miller, & Tonigan, 1993).  Brief motivational interviewing interventions focus on 
altering a person’s intrinsic motivation to help modify behavior.  Researchers have shown 
brief motivational interviewing interventions to work in a number of domains, including 
helping deal with alcohol abuse, improving school success, and improving family 
relationships (Bien, Miller, & Tonigan, 1993; Herman, Reinke, Frey, & Shepard, 2013).  
What researchers have shown brief motivational interviewing to do for alcohol abuse, a 
similarly short and effective I-sharing intervention might be able to do for relationships. 
To create an effective I-sharing intervention one should focus on the key factors 
researchers have suggested influence whether one concludes one has I-shared with 
another or not.  As noted before, Pinel and colleagues (2006) suggested that the most 
foolproof cue that one I-shares with another occurs when one reacts identically and 
simultaneously to the same stimulus.  Pinel, Long, and Huneke (2015), for instance, 
showed that delays in receiving I-sharing information reduced cooperation for I-sharers 
in a prisoner’s dilemma game, but that delays had no effect on Me-sharers.  The best 
chance of fostering I-sharing between individuals, then, is putting them in a situation in 
which they both are likely to react similarly and simultaneously to the same stimulus, and 
in which individuals are given the chance to infer that shared experience. 
To ensure I-sharing occurs, researchers and interventionists should first engineer a 
situation that maximizes the likelihood that people will experience a stimulus presented 
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identically.  As I will discuss in the next section, having people experience novel, 
emotionally arousing stimuli that provoke predictably similar reactions represents a 
theoretically powerful way of fostering I-sharing.   In addition, to ensure an I-sharing 
experience, interventionists should also create a context in which people can make an 
inference that the other person experiences a stimulus similarly.  When people witness 
and infer another person’s experience, and conclude that that person has an identical 
experience to their own, they will then conclude that they I-shared with the person.  In the 
sections that follow, I discuss ways one can increase the chances a stimulus will foster I-
sharing, and ways that that one can create a situation that increases the chances 
individuals will make an inference of I-sharing. 
Providing Stimuli that Will Likely Foster I-sharing 
On September 11th, 2001 the U.S. and world were shocked by the tragic 
destruction of the Twin Towers, the attack on the Pentagon, and the downing of Flight 93 
in Pennsylvania.  During this tragedy, millions of Americans watched the same stimulus 
of the planes crashing into the Twin Towers.  This stimulus created largely universal 
reactions of sadness and anger in Americans.  Even as people’s actual reactions to the 
terrorist attacks may have varied a little, by and large people believed they experienced 
the horror roughly similarly, and thus many I-shared regarding this tragic event.  Such 
tragic events likely bring together individuals in part due to these shared experiences.  
Similar to how the original TV broadcasts most certainly elicited I-sharing experiences in 
many individuals, finding stimuli that people largely react similarly to, and having them 
experience those stimuli together may be one of the best ways to create I-sharing, and 
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thus to improve relations.   
But what stimuli may elicit such global responses?  A combination of cognitive 
and neuroscientific research indicates that stimuli that are novel and emotionally arousing 
are the likeliest to establish both universal reactions, and powerful subjective responses 
(Johnston, Hawley, Plewe, Elliott, & DeWitt, 1990; Aron, Norman, Aron, McKenna, & 
Heyman, 2000).  To have the greatest success at making I-contact, researchers should 
expose individuals to novel stimuli that elicit strong emotions.   
Interventionists should select novel stimuli because people’s experience with a 
stimulus changes with each experience of it; in other words, individuals become 
habituated to a stimulus with repeated exposure (Rankin et al., 2009).  Watching the 
planes hit the Twin Towers in archival footage may elicit different, or less intense, 
responses now than when people first witnessed this terrifying scene.  When an 
individual has seen a stimulus, and another has not, then the individuals’ experiences of 
that stimulus may differ simply because of this factor.  After people’s original in-the-
moment experience passes, their memory of how they experienced a stimulus also 
becomes a part of the Me (albeit a part that also is quite indicative of the I), and thus they 
may infer some shared aspect of the Me over a shared aspect of the I.  In addition, 
individuals pay more visual and mental attention to novel stimuli (Johnston, Hawley, 
Plewe, Elliott, & DeWitt, 1990; Rankin et al., 2009), and thus the chances of making I-
sharing inferences increases as this increased attention likely makes one more in tune 
with one’s own experience of it, thereby making a person more able to see similarities 
between one’s own, and another’s experience.   
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Providing stimuli to two individuals that neither of them has seen therefore should 
increase the chances that those two people will experience the stimuli similarly.  Thus, to 
ensure one elicits the strongest inferences of I-sharing, interventionists should have 
individuals experience novel stimuli together.   
Interventionists should also select emotionally evocative stimuli because 
emotionally evocative stimuli both increase the chances that one will have the same 
experience as another, and that one will pick up on that similarity.  From the sadness felt 
after the death of a beloved celebrity, to the annoyance and anger felt from the sound of a 
loud nearby jackhammer, to the joy of seeing individuals smile, emotion-inducing stimuli 
often elicit strong and similar emotional reactions from different people (Brosch, 
Pourtois, & Sander, 2010).   
Emotionally evocative stimuli also cause people to pick up more on their own, 
and other people’s subjective experiences.  As compared to when people are exposed to 
neutral stimuli, humans show increased brain activity (especially in the amygdala) when 
they are exposed to emotionally arousing stimuli (Hamann, Ely, Grafton, & Kilts, 1999), 
and use more cognitive resources processing emotionally arousing stimuli (Loftus, 1980).  
Thus it should come as no surprise that people tend both to pay more attention to 
emotionally evocative stimuli (Hartikainen, Ogawa, Soltani, & Knight, 2007), and 
remember emotionally arousing stimuli better (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 
1992).  This increased attention and memory should thus increase the chances that one 
will pick up on a similarity another person has to one’s own subjective state as one can 
recognize one’s own state more accurately.  Emotionally evocative stimuli also elicit 
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automatic reactions in others that one can pick up on (Fasel & Luettin, 2003), further 
improving the chances one will notice a similarity.   
Not surprisingly, research already shows that sharing stimuli that are novel and 
arousing (albeit not specifically emotionally) may positively influence interpersonal 
relationships (Aron, Norman, Aron, McKenna, & Heyman, 2000).  In several studies, 
Aron et al. (2000) randomly assigned romantic couples to complete a 7-minute physically 
arousing and novel task (being tied together and having to navigate obstacles over mats), 
or a similar, but more mundane task (having to roll a ball across the same mats).  They 
found that couples assigned to the arousing and novel task reported greater increases in 
relationship satisfaction than couples in the more mundane task.  From an I-sharing 
perspective, one might expect such a result, as novel and arousing stimuli and actions 
would create a higher probability that two individuals will both experience a stimuli in 
the same way, and that they will pick up on those experiences.   
In determining what stimuli might provoke universal responses and foster I-
sharing, one should thus look toward emotionally-arousing stimuli that individuals have 
never experienced before.  Short films represent one potentially promising way of 
eliciting a novel, emotionally evocative, and universal experience.  First, people in 
general have not seen them, making them novel.  Second, like feature length films, short 
films have the capacity to elicit strong and often predictable emotional responses.  
Finally, from an intervention standpoint, short films fit in the abbreviated time frame of 
an intervention or experiment.  Thus, having people experience novel and emotionally 




Having a stimulus that individuals will subjectively experience in the same way, 
and that will promote I-sharing only represents one part of the equation.  If two people 
actually have the same experience, but do not recognize that they do, then they will not 
know that they have I-shared.  I-sharing specifically relies on individuals believing they 
have shared an in-the-moment subjective experience.  For instance, at any given point in 
time all across the world, people watching live TV might be having the same subjective 
experience.  Millions of individuals might react with horror as a major character in one of 
their favorite shows is killed.  If one is alone, or not picking up on another person’s 
experience of the fictional death, then one will not have I-shared.  Only if one infers that 
another individual experiences something similarly will one believe one has I-shared.   
Thus creating a context where individuals can infer one another’s experience represents 
another key ingredient in fostering I-sharing.   
Creating a Context that Will Likely Foster I-sharing 
 In addition to providing a stimulus that will foster I-sharing, one must also 
create a context that will foster I-sharing.  A context ripe for I-sharing should allow for 
individuals to make inferences about another individual’s experience of a stimulus.  To 
accomplish this, the interpersonal situation should allow for individuals to perceive, and 
at least subconsciously pay attention to, one another’s experience.   
Accomplishing this involves having individuals experience stimuli in situations 
where their senses can directly detect the expressions of others.  If individuals are unable 
to detect the expressions of others, even when they are experiencing the same stimuli at 
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the same time, they will not be able to infer whether they I-shared, or not.    For instance, 
two individuals in a long distance relationship may watch a movie together over the 
internet.  Although perhaps a more pleasant experience than watching the movie alone, 
they may fail to establish an existential connection in such a situation because they 
cannot ascertain one another’s in-the-moment states.  Just watching the same movie at the 
same time as another person, such as through the internet, may not be enough.  From an 
I-sharing perspective, it is also important that individuals are able to infer the experience 
of others.  I-sharing interventions should thus provide an opportunity for individuals to 
sense the experiences of others.  This may be particularly difficult in present-day society, 
which often contains constant distractions.  From busy streets, to the internet, to 
smartphones, people are constantly bombarded with stimuli that wrestle for their attention 
(Campbell, 2006).  Providing a situation where individuals actively disconnect from such 
overstimulation would increase the chances of them noticing their shared subjective 
experiences. 
There also may be situations where a person resists putting effort into 
experiencing the same stimuli (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Long, 
2007).  As discussed before this may occur in situations where people already dislike 
each other (Long, 2007).  In addition, in situations where one is unable to notice another 
person’s experiences (such as watching a movie over the internet), or where one needs to 
put in a lot of effort to notice those experiences, people might not notice each other’s 
experiences.  Consider initial efforts by Sherif et al. (1961), whereby competing groups at 
a camp that detested each other watched a maritime instructional video in the same room.  
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The groups, as one would expect, sat along group lines.  As it was much easier for the 
campers to examine the experiences of their nearby ingroup than it was to witness the 
outgroup, the campers likely did not even pick up on how the outgroup members were 
experiencing the instructional video.  Not surprisingly Sherif witnessed no change in the 
ingroup/outgroup divides.  Removing competing reaction and distance barriers by having 
two people sit side by side, and in isolation from other people, should thus also increase 
the chances that they will pick up on similar experiences.   
By decreasing the rate of distraction, and creating a situation where people can 
pick up on each other’s experiences, interventionists should increase the rates of I-sharing 
between people experiencing the world similarly.  In the next section I discuss how one 
might go about testing such an intervention. 
The Current Study 
The current study tested two main research questions.  First, does jointly exposing 
people to novel and emotionally evocative stimuli that create predictable reactions in 
viewers, in a situation in which the viewers can infer another’s experience, promote I-
sharing and subsequent interpersonal connection?  Second, does this effect extend across 
differing levels of Me similarity, such as situations in which individuals know of a 
previous value disagreement, agreement, or in which they have no information of 
another’s beliefs?  Previous I-sharing research indicates that I-sharing can help overcome 
such “Me-sharing” (Pinel & Long, 2012); does jointly experiencing novel and 
emotionally evocative stimuli that create predictable reactions help overcome these 
differences as well?  Or do differences in the Me diminish the effectiveness of this type 
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of I-sharing intervention?  
To test these questions, I had participants come into the lab two at a time, and 
remain in the same room as one another.  Participants initially filled out a value 
questionnaire aimed at deriving some Me-sharing information (i.e., their values).  I then 
randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions – a dissimilar-Me condition, a 
similar-Me condition, or a No Info Me condition.  The researcher collected and looked at 
these responses, and, unknown to the participants, had participants write an essay either 
on the topic that they disagreed the most on, or the one they agreed the most on.  In the 
dissimilar-Me condition, participants wrote and then read each other’s essays on the topic 
on which they disagreed the most.  In the similar-Me condition, participants wrote and 
then read each other’s essays on the topic on which they agreed the most.  In the No Info 
Me condition, participants wrote about the topic they disagreed on the most, but did not 
read each other’s essays and so did not receive any value similarity information.   
I then randomly assigned participants to one of two I-sharing conditions.  
Participants in the Fostered I-sharing condition experienced the same novel and 
emotionally evocative short films together, at the same time, and is such a way that they 
could see each other’s reactions. Participants in the comparison condition were able to 
see each other’s reactions, but experienced the stimuli in a different order from one 
another, and were not able to see the stimuli which the other person was reacting to (and 
so could not make an inference of I-sharing).  In addition the researcher told participants 
in the comparison condition that they were experiencing different stimuli so that they 
would not assume they I-shared simply because they were watching the same things. By 
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having participants actually experience the same stimuli though, and having them able to 
see each other in both conditions, one can rule out that either the stimuli, or the mere 
exposure effect (see Zajonc, 1968), might lead to any differences between the conditions.   
For all participants, I then asked how much they believed their own subjective 
experiences and the other participant’s experiences overlapped (i.e., perceived subjective 
similarity).  Participants also rated how much they liked the other person and responded 
to two interpersonal behavioral measures (providing or not providing their phone number 
to the other participant, and allotting remaining time to talking with the other participant 
vs. surfing the net).   
I hypothesized that participants in the Fostered I-Sharing condition would rate the 
other participant as more subjectively similar (have more similar ‘I’s) than participants in 
the comparison condition.  I also expected participants in the Fostered I-sharing condition 
to like the other participant more, give their phone number out more to, and allocate more 
time talking to the other participant than participants in the comparison condition.  I 
hypothesized that these interpersonal effects would either occur across all levels of the 
Me-sharing manipulation, or, in line with research suggesting individuals might resist I-
sharing with those that they dislike (see Long, 2007), that initial disagreement on the Me-
sharing dimension would reduce the effectiveness of the I-sharing manipulation.  In line 
with I-sharing theorizing, I also expected perceived subjective similarity to mediate the I-
sharing condition to liking and behavioral measure relationships (Long, Pinel, & Yawger, 






 144 undergraduate students (77 stranger dyads) from a large northeastern public 
university completed the study for course extra credit.  91.7 percent of participants 
identified themselves as White, 4.9% as Black or African-American, 6.3% as Asian, 
1.4% as American Indian, and 1.4% as Native Hawaiian or Other. 4.2% also identified 
themselves as Hispanic or Latino.  78.5% of participants identified themselves as female, 
and 21.5% as male.  Forty-six of the dyads were both female, five of the dyads were both 
male, and twenty-one of the dyads were mixed gender. The average age of participants 
was 19.13 years old.   
Design 
 I randomly assigned participants to one of two I-sharing conditions.  Participants in 
the Fostered I-Sharing condition watched the same novel and emotionally evocative short 
films simultaneously and on the same screen.  Participants in the comparison condition 
watched the same short films in a different order from one another and on different 
screens.  In both conditions, participants could see one another’s reactions, but in the 
comparison condition participants could not see one another’s screens.  I also assigned 
participants to learn that their partner had either a conflicting Me that might cause dislike 
of the other participant, a similar Me that might facilitate liking, or no Me information.  
Thus, I used a 2 (I-sharing Condition: Fostered I-sharing vs Comparison) X 3 (Initial Me 




Materials- Pretesting the Short Films 
 I used three short films for my I-sharing manipulation in all conditions: Jinxy 
Jenkins & Lucky Lou; Chateau de Sable; and The Piano (see Appendix C for links to 
these films). All films came from Youtube and received over 50 likes to each dislike, 
suggesting people universally like them.  Jinxy Jenkins & Lucky Lou is a romantic 
comedy about a female (Jinxy Jenkins) for whom everything annoyingly always seems to 
go right, and a male (Lucky Lou) for whom everything seems to go wrong.  Chateau de 
Sable is a slightly scary epic about a sand-castle defending itself from invasion by a crab.  
The Piano briefly tells the story of a man’s life around a melancholic piano piece.   
 Prior to the experiment, I pretested these films to see if individuals largely reacted 
similarly to them, and to verify that they would be new to my sample.  Six participants 
recruited through Facebook and twenty-five participants recruited through the 
psychology participant pool completed the pretest online.  Participants watched the three 
videos and, after each video, answered a number of questions about each video on 6 point 
Likert scales labeled as 1-Strongly Disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-Somewhat Disagree, 4-
Somewhat Agree, 5-Agree, 6-Strongly Agree.  Three questions regarded their emotional 
reactions (comicality for Jinxy Jenkins and Lucky Lou, fear for Chateau de Sable, and 
sadness for the Piano; e.g. I think the previous video was funny).  One question for each 
video assessed whether participants thought the video was emotionally evocative, and 
one item assessed whether participants thought others would react similarly to the video 
(see Appendix A).   To see if the videos were novel I also asked a yes or no question 
regarding whether participants had seen the particular video before.   No individuals 
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reported having seen any of the three videos, suggesting they were all novel.  To assess 
potential agreement, I first recoded all five Likert questions into whether participants 
agreed (somewhat agreed, agreed, or strongly agreed) or disagreed (somewhat disagreed, 
disagreed, or strongly disagreed) with the statement.   
 In terms of whether the short films were emotionally evocative, 93.5 percent agreed 
that Jinxy Jenkins & Lucky Lou was emotionally evocative, 77.4 percent agreed that 
Chateau de Sable was emotionally evocative, and 100 percent agreed that The Piano was 
emotionally evocative.  In terms of the hypothesized emotions for each video, 90.3 
percent of participants agreed that Jinxy Jenkins and Lucky Lou was funny, 64.5 percent 
of participants agreed Chateau de Sable was scary, and 100 percent of participants agreed 
that The Piano was sad.  87.1% of participants thought that others would react similarly 
to Jinxy Jenkins & Lucky Lou, 74.2% of participants thought others would react similarly 
to Chateau de Sable, and 90.3% of participants thought others would react similarly to the 
Piano.  These results suggested that overall individuals believed they would likely react 
similarly to someone else to the short films chosen. 
Procedure of the Main Study 
 For each available research session, participants signed up for one of two available 
time slots.   The sign up instructions asked participants not to sign up for slots when they 
knew the other person who signed up.  Participants thus came into the lab two strangers 
at a time.  When both participants had arrived, they read and signed consent forms and 
the study began.  First came the Me-sharing manipulation. 
 Me-sharing manipulation.  Participants first indicated their values (an aspect of 
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the Me) by answering a pen and paper questionnaire regarding potential values they 
might have.   Participants answered the value questions on nine point Likert scales 
ranging from “Should” on one end to “Should Not” on the other (e.g. I believe that 
individuals who enter this country illegally ______ be deported back to their home 
countries, See Appendix A).  The other topics participants responded about were doctor 
assisted suicide, the legalization of marijuana, second trimester abortions, the banning of 
wearing animal fur, and transgender bathroom practices.  After collecting responses, the 
research assistant surreptitiously looked at both participants’ responses and determined 
which topic participants should write about.  For participants in the No Me Information 
and dissimilar-Me conditions, the research assistant determined the topic on which 
participants disagreed the most, and instructed them to write a paragraph on that topic.  
Participants on average differed by 4.75 points for the No Info (SD = 1.92), and 4.61 
points for the dissimilar-Me condition (SD = 1.7).  For the similar-Me condition, the 
research assistant determined the topic on which participants agreed the most, and 
instructed them to write using a pen and paper a paragraph on that topic (see Appendix 
B).   Participants on average differed by .24 points in the similar-Me condition (SD = 
.52).  After writing their paragraphs, participants in the dissimilar-Me and similar-Me 
conditions received two minutes to read each other’s paragraphs. Participants in the No 
Me Information condition did not read each other’s paragraphs, and so did not know of 
the disagreement.  Did participants on average write about different topics in the similar-
Me as compared to the two essay conditions where participants wrote about a topic of 
disagreement (the dissimilar-Me and No Me Info conditions)?  Yes, in terms of topics, 
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participants on average agreed the most on the topics of legalization of Marijuana and 
transgender bathroom practices.  Participants therefore wrote about these topics more 
often in the similar-Me  condition, than did participants in the two essay conditions where 
participants wrote about a topic of disagreement (in the No Info, and dissimilar-Me 
conditions).  Participants on average disagreed the most more on illegal immigration and 
thereby wrote more about illegal immigration in the dissimilar-Me and No-info 
conditions more than in the similar-Me condition.   
 I-sharing manipulation.  After the Me-sharing manipulation, participants watched 
the three novel, and emotionally arousing short animated films (Jinxy Jenkins & Lucky 
Lou, Chateau de Sable, and The Piano).  Participants in the Fostered I-sharing condition 
watched these films simultaneously, on the same computer and without headphones.  
Participants in the comparison condition watched the same three films as one another, but 
in a different order from one another (e.g. one participant watched Jinxy Jenkins & Lucky 
Lou, then the Piano, then Chateau de Sable; for the other participant, he or she watched 
Chateau de Sable, then Jinxy Jenkins & Lucky Lou, then the Piano).  In the comparison 
condition, a divider blocked the screen of the other participant, but not the participants 
themselves, and participants wore headphones.  In addition, in the comparison condition, 
the researcher told participants they would be watching different videos. 
 Dependent variables and mediators.  After watching the three short films, 
participants answered a number of questions regarding the other person in the room.  So 
that I could examine subjective similarity as both its own dependent variable, and also as 
mediator for any interpersonal effects, participants first answered a measure of subjective 
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similarity.  The subjective similarity questionnaire consisted of four items to which 
participants indicated their agreement on a seven point Likert scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree.  The items tapped into how similarly participants believed 
they experienced stimuli the same as the other participant (α = .73, e.g. “The other 
participant and I experience stimuli similarly,” see Appendix D).   
 To rule out potential alternate explanations - that perceived objective similarity 
(belief that one shares objective traits, such as group status), or that expanding oneself to 
include the other in one’s self-concept might lead to any potential interpersonal results 
(see Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) - participants then also answered questionnaires 
regarding these alternative potential mediators.  For instance it might be possible that 
instead of increased feelings of I-sharing, participants who underwent the intervention 
might feel as if the other participant is now a part of their ingroup (an objective 
similarity), or that the other participant’s self now overlaps with their own.  In each of 
these cases, these alternative mediators might cause any effect on interpersonal 
connection rather than I-sharing.  To help tease out these alternative explanations, I had 
participants answer a four item measure of perceived objective similarity on a seven point 
Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree (α = .75, “The other 
participant and I likely ascribe to the same groups,” see Appendix E) and the one item 
self-expansion question taken from Aron, Aron, and Smollan (1992, see Appendix F).   
 I then had participants complete my main dependent variables.  To examine liking, 
participants answered, on a six point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree, a six item liking questionnaire taken from previous I-sharing research (α = 
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.84, e.g. “I like the other participant,” see Appendix G).   
 As feelings for another do not always translate into behavior, I also then had 
participants respond to two behavioral measures.  The first consisted of asking 
participants on the computer whether they were willing to exchange their phone number 
with the other participant followed by them actually providing their phone number if they 
wanted to exchange numbers.  I coded participants who reported they would exchange 
numbers, but then did not provide a potentially usable phone number (one that contained 
7 or 10 digits) when prompted, as not having provided their phone number.   
 Participants then completed a second behavioral measure asking participants how 
much time they would allocate to talking with the other participant.  Participants 
responded to a one item prompt asking how much of the remaining time they would like 
to allocate to chatting with the other participant or alternatively surfing the internet (see 
Appendix H).  Responses were made on a ten-point scale ranging from “1 minute 
talking/11 minutes surfing” to “11 minutes talking/1 minute surfing” 
 Other Measures.  After completing the dependent measures, participants filled out 
a demographic questionnaire (see Appendix I).  As research shows that existential 
isolation can play a pivotal role in I-sharing (see Pinel et al., 2006), I also included a six-
item trait existential isolation questionnaire (Pinel, Long, Murdoch, & Helm, 2017; α = 
.77, e.g. “Other people usually do not understand my experiences,” see Appendix J).  
Finally I included an added manipulation check questionnaire (see Appendix K).  After 
finishing the questionnaires the research assistant debriefed participants on the true nature 




 I predicted that participants in the Fostered I-sharing condition would report 
more perceived subjective similarity, more liking, provide their phone number more, and 
allocate more time to talking with the other participant than would participants in the 
comparison condition.  I further predicted that this would either occur for all participants, 
or only participants who did not initially know of a value disagreement between them and 
their interaction partner.   
Recall that participants came into the lab in dyads.  Thus, before diving into 
testing my main hypotheses, I first needed to determine whether my observations were 
independent or not. Kenny, Kashy, and Cook (2006) outlined the importance of 
recognizing nonindependence in dyadic data, as traditional statistical analyses assume 
individuals as the unit of analysis, and assume independence of observations.  When 
researchers examine partners (e.g. husbands and wives, friends) the data of one partner 
sometimes affects, or covaries, with the data of the other partner.  Thus, the choice of 
statistical tool depends on whether data show signs of nonindependence, and, if they do, a 
researcher should use the dyad, rather than the individual, as the unit of analysis in order 
to account for this dyadic covariance.  The number of dyads in my sample (77) provided 
sufficient power to test for nonindependence (Kenny, Kashy & Cook 2006).  I tested 
nonindependence through the partial correlation coefficient given in multilevel 
modelling, controlling for my predictor variables (Kenny, Kashy, and Cook 2006).  
Significant nonindependence results did not appear for perceived subjective similarity 
(CSR rho = .05, p = .71), phone number exchange (CSR rho = .15, p = .20), and talk time 
 
27 
(CSR rho = .1, p = .39), and thus I could treat them as independent (Kenny, Kashy, & 
Cook, 2006).  My dependent variable of liking, however, showed significant 
nonindependence (CSR rho = .32, p = .002).  One might expect this as research shows 
that individuals tend to like those who like them (Lowe & Goldstein. 1970).  As I 
randomly assigned each dyad to a condition based on my I-sharing and Me-sharing 
manipulations (rather than each participant separately) I had two between-dyad 
independent variables in a hierarchical nested design (where participants are nested 
within dyads, and dyads are nested within my two independent variables).  In line with 
Kenny, Kashy, and Cook’s (2006) recommendations, I summed liking scores between 
dyad members to form a dyad-level score.  As the liking scores were now identical across 
the dyad, I used one member of the pair as the participant for liking analyses.  By 
creating such a summed score, I retained variation from each participant, while still 
controlling for dyadic covariance (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006).  Although this 
diminishes power to a degree due to a loss of degrees of freedom, the added potential 
differences between the summed differences (if an effect exists) mitigates a good amount 
of this power loss (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006). 
To first see if the I-sharing intervention affected perceptions of subjective 
similarity, I ran a 2 (I-sharing condition: Fostered I-sharing vs. Comparison) X 3 (Me-
sharing condition: Dissimilar-Me, Similar-Me, No Me Information) ANOVA with 
perceived subjective similarity as the dependent variable.  Two-tailed results showed that, 
as predicted, there was a main effect of I-sharing condition on perceived subjective 
similarity.  Participants in the Fostered I-sharing condition (M = 3.82, SD = .74) reported 
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greater feelings of subjective similarity than participants in the comparison condition (M 
= 3.52, SD = .87), F(1, 138) = 5.64, p = .02, η2 = .04.  There was also a main effect of 
Me-similarity condition on perceived subjective similarity, F(2, 138) = 6.37, p = .05, η2= 
.04.  Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that participants in the similar-Me condition (M = 
3.8, SD = .71) reported marginally significantly more perceived subjective similarity (p < 
.10), than those in the dissimilar-Me condition (M = 3.45, SD = .95).  Bonferroni post hoc 
tests revealed no difference between participants in the No Me Information condition (M 
= 3.76, SD = .73) and other Me-similarity conditions. There was also no significant 
interaction of I-sharing and Me-similarity conditions, F(2, 138) = 1.29, p = .28.  See table 
1 for a full list of means and standard deviations for all conditions regarding perceived 
subjective similarity and all of my other dependent measures. 
To examine whether the above subjective similarity results occurred primarily due 
to perceived objective similarity, I reran the previous 2 (I-sharing condition) X 3 (Me-
similarity condition) ANOVA adding perceived objective similarity as a covariate.  Two-
tailed results showed that, not surprisingly, with perceived objective similarity as a 
covariate, I no longer found an effect of the Me-similarity condition on perceived 
subjective similarity, F(2, 137) = .103, p = .9.  With perceived objective similarity as a 
covariate, I still, however, found a marginally significant effect of the I-sharing 
manipulation on perceived subjective similarity F(1, 137)  = 2.93, p = .09, η2= .02.   
One might still wonder whether the I-sharing manipulation also affected objective 
similarity.  Running a 2 (I-sharing condition) X 3 (Me-similarity condition) ANOVA 
with subjective similarity now as a covariate, and perceived objective similarity as the 
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dependent variable, I showed that, not surprisingly, the Me-similarity manipulation 
significantly affected perceived objective similarity, F(2, 137) = 7.13, p = .001, but that 
the I-sharing manipulation did not, F(1, 137) = .618, p = .43. 
To see if the I-sharing intervention affected liking, I ran a 2 (I-sharing Condition: 
Fostered I-sharing vs. Control) X 3 (Me-sharing condition: Dissimilar-Me, Similar-Me, 
or No Me Information) ANOVA with summed dyad liking score as the dependent 
variable, and each dyad serving as one unit.  Two-tailed results showed no main effect of 
I-sharing condition (F[1, 66] = 1.34, p = .25), Me-sharing condition (F[2, 66] = 1.9, p = 
.16), or interaction effect (F[2, 66]= .43, p = .65).   
As planned, I also tested the effect of I-sharing condition on liking across 
differing levels of Me-sharing condition.  Results showed no effect of my manipulation 
for participants in the dissimilar-Me condition, t(21) = .23, p = .82, or No Me Information 
condition, t(22) = .277, p = .79.  The I-sharing manipulation did however significantly 
affect summed dyad liking scores for participants randomly assigned to the similar-Me 
condition (t(23) = 2.49, p = .03, d = .93).   The dyads who first learned of a similar Me, 
and then underwent the Fostered I-sharing manipulation, reported significantly more 
liking (M = 8.04, SD = .66) than similar-Me dyads who were in the I-sharing comparison 
condition (M = 7.47, SD = .56).   
The small sample from just the Me-similarity condition made tests for mediation 
by perceived subjective similarity of this liking effect underpowered (and efforts showed 
no significant results).  Examining whole sample partial correlations, controlling for both 
perceived objective similarity and how much the other participant liked them, did show 
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that perceived subjective similarity significantly correlated with participant’s liking, 
r(140) = .22, p = .007.  This suggests that perceived subjective similarity does indeed 
predict liking, and that efforts to increase perceived subjective similarity may bear 
interpersonal fruit.  To further ensure that these partial correlation effects were not due to 
potential increased Type 1 error rate due to non-independence I also analyzed these data 
using the actor-partner interdependence model and multilevel mixed modelling (Kenny, 
Kashy, & Cook, 2006).  These analyses provided similar results to the partial 
correlations with both actor perceived subjective similarity, t(133.83) = 2.76, p < .01 and 
actor perceived objective similarity, t(133.83) = 3.84, p < .001, significantly predicting 
actor liking.  Neither partner perceived subjective similarity, t(133.83) = .125, p = 
.901, nor partner perceived objective similarity, t(133.83) = 1.52, p =.11, significantly 
predict actor liking.  Along with other experimental data (see Pinel et al., 2006), these 
data suggest that, despite no mediation effects, efforts to increase perceived subjective 
similarity would also likely increase liking.    
To see if participants’ willingness to give their phone numbers depended on I-
sharing condition, I ran a Chi-Square difference test layered by Me-similarity condition.  
I found no significant main effect of I-sharing condition, χ2(1, N = 144) = 1.71, p = .19.  
Layered by Me-similarity condition, I found no significant effect of the I-sharing 
manipulation in the dissimilar-Me condition, χ2(1, N = 46) = 1.37, p = .24, and No Me 
Information condition, χ2(1, N = 48) = .37, p = .55.  I did, however, find a marginally 
significant effect of the I-sharing manipulation on phone number giving again for 
participants in the similar-Me condition, χ2(1, N = 50) = 3.17, p = .07, Cramer’s V = .25.  
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In terms of participants in the similar-Me condition, 85 percent of participants whom I 
randomly assigned to watch the videos together gave their phone number, as compared to 
63 percent of those who watch the videos separately.  See table 1 again for proportions 
for all cells. 
To see if the I-sharing intervention affected time devoted to talking, I ran a 2 (I-
sharing condition: Fostered I-sharing vs Comparison) X 3 (Me-sharing condition: 
Dissimilar-Me, Similar-Me, or No Me Information) ANOVA with allotted talking time as 
the dependent variable.  There was no main effect of I-sharing condition on time devoted 
to talking (F(1, 138) = .01, p = .92), or of Me-sharing condition on time devoted to 
talking (F(2, 138) = .743, p = .74).  There was, however, a marginally significant 
interaction effect (F(2, 138) = 2.54, p = .08).  Time allocation scores varied widely (M = 
5.49, SD = 2.68); a large number of individuals (19; 13.2 percent) assigned either the 
maximum or minimum possible value.  As the maximum and minimum values were only 
roughly two standard deviations from the mean, and the data failed normality tests (e.g. 
Shapiro-Wilk = .945, df = 144, p < .001) I used Independent Samples Mann-Whitney U 
tests instead of t-tests to test simple effects of I-sharing condition across Me-sharing 
conditions (see LaMorte, 2016; PROPHET, 1997). A Mann-Whitney U test indicated 
that, for participants in the similar-Me condition, median talk time was again marginally 
significantly greater for participants in the Fostered I-sharing condition (Mdn = 6 
minutes) than for participants in the comparison condition (Mdn = 5 minutes), U = 226.5, 
N = 50 , p = .09.  In addition, a Mann-Whitney U test indicated that, for participants in 
the No Me Information condition, median talk time was unexpectedly marginally 
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significantly greater for participants in the comparison condition (Mdn = 6 minutes) than 
for participants in the Fostered I-sharing condition (Mdn = 5 minutes), U = 198, N = 48, p 
= .06.  No significant difference between I-sharing conditions appeared for participants in 
the dissimilar-Me condition, U = 231, N = 46, p = .47.  (As an aside, if instead of using a 
Mann-Whitney U test, I used t-tests after removing the 19 minimum and maximum value 
assigners, then statistically significant results appeared for all marginally significant time 
allocation results I reported in this paragraph.)   
Ancillary Analyses 
As the effect of the I-sharing manipulation on perceived subjective similarity was 
smaller than expected, and previous research has shown existential isolation to play a 
pivotal role in I-sharing effects (see Pinel et al., 2006), I used PROCESS Model 1 
moderation (Hayes, 2013), controlling for dummy coded Me-similarity condition, to test 
whether existential isolation influenced the effect of the I-sharing manipulation on 
perceived subjective similarity.  Results showed a significant effect of I-sharing 
condition, b = .30, t(139) = 2.32, p = .02, and also showed a significant effect of 
existential isolation, b = -.21, t(139) = -2.43, p = .02.   As research suggests that I-sharing 
increases interpersonal attraction in existentially isolated individuals the most (see Pinel 
et al., 2006), one might wonder whether the I-sharing intervention likewise also affected 
perceived subjective similarity the strongest for those who scored high on levels of 
existential isolation.  Although no significant interaction effect occurred b = .07, t(139) = 
.60, p = .7, examination of the Johnson-Neyman technique showed that, on the contrary, 
the effect of the I-sharing manipulation on subjective similarity only existed for 
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individuals who were not high on existential isolation.  Unlike participants not high in 
existential isolation, participants in the top 30 percent of existential isolation scores 
showed no significant effect of the I-sharing manipulation [see Figure 1]).  This suggests 
that the I-sharing manipulation failed to produce feelings of I-sharing with the population 
it may have the most influence on - existentially isolated individuals. 
One might also wonder whether other subject factors related to the Me that 
naturally varied between participants (such as gender) affected perceived subjective 
similarity or interacted with my I-sharing or Me-similarity manipulation to affect 
perceived subjective similarity.  For instance research shows that females pick up on 
emotional cues more easily than men do (see Collignon, Girard, Gosselin, Saint-Amour, 
Lepore, & Lassonde, 2010), and express emotions more often (Jansz, 2000; Kring & 
Gordon, 1998).  Given this, it might be that the I-sharing manipulation more strongly 
affected female-female dyads as they might pick up on, and give off more, nonverbal 
emotional cues.  
To investigate whether gender affected my subjective similarity results, I ran my 
previous 2 (I-sharing condition: Fostered, Comparison) X 3 (Me-similarity condition: 
Me-similar, Me-dissimilar, No Me Info) ANOVA with an additional subject factor of 
whether the dyad did not have a male in the dyad (the female-female dyads) or had a 
male in the dyad (the male-female dyads, and male-male dyads).  I did such an analysis 
rather than a full factorial as 64% of my dyads were female-female and I did not have 
enough male-male dyads to run a full factorial.  If the I-sharing manipulation were more 
effective with females, then one would expect an I-sharing condition by “male in dyad” 
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interaction such that there would be bigger differences between the I-sharing and 
comparison condition in the female-female dyads than in the dyads that included a male.  
Results showed the previous significant I-sharing, F(1, 132)  = 4.29, p = .04, η2= .03,  
and Me-similarity results, F(2, 132)  = 3.48, p = .03, η2= .05.  The I-sharing by “male in 
dyad” interaction was not significant, F(1, 132)  = .135 , p = .71, nor were any other 
interactions.  This suggests the intervention was not more effective for female-female 
dyads.  The means also trended in the opposite direction such that the mean reported 
perceived subjective similarity differences were greater for participants in a dyad with at 
least one male (Difference = .47; I-sharing: M = 3.8, SD = .79; Comparison: M = 3.33, 
SD = 1.01) than for participants in female-female dyads (Difference = .2; I-sharing: M = 
3.83, SD = .71; Comparison: M = 3.63, SD = .75).  Examining the simple I-sharing effect 
just for females in the female-female dyads did not show a significant effect, t(90) = 
.1.32, p = .18, likely at least in part due to a lack of power and a smaller than expected 
main effect.  The simple I-sharing effect of just participants in the male-female dyads 
showed a marginally significant I-sharing intervention effect t(50) = 1.87, p = .07, d =.52, 
with, as reported above, participants in dyads with a male reporting more subjective 
similarity in the I-sharing condition than the comparison condition.   
To examine gender a different way I also examined whether males and females 
differed in the mixed dyad pairs.  As partner gender confounds any conclusions about 
participant gender one could obviously not conclude one way or another regarding 
whether the I-sharing manipulation is better or worse for males or females.  Such an 
analysis, however, would help determine whether an effect of gender occurs at all.  
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Selecting just male-female dyads I ran a 2 (I-sharing condition) X 3 (Me-similarity) X 2 
(Participant Gender: Male, Female) ANOVA with perceived subjective similarity as the 
dependent variable.  No significant I-sharing condition X Gender effect occurred, F(1, 
30)  = .1, p = .75.  The mean reported perceived subjective similarity differences were 
roughly the same for males (Difference = .25; I-sharing: M = 3.94, SD = .76; 
Comparison: M = 3.69, SD = 1.07) and females (Difference = .27; I-sharing: M = 3.44, 
SD = .85; Comparison: M = 3.17, SD = .86).  This again suggests that I-sharing 
intervention affected males and females similarly.  All of these gender results combined 
make it unlikely that the I-sharing manipulation I tested is more effective in females than 
in males.   
In the mixed-dyad analyses, however, a marginally significant main effect of 
gender, appeared, F(1, 30)  = 3.16, p = .09, η2= .1, such that males overall perceived 
more subjective similarity from females (M = 3.8, SD = .94), than females did from males 
(M = 3.29, SD = .85).  This gender difference, along with other differences in the Me, 
likely added noise.  This likely made finding a significant effect of the I-sharing 
manipulation more difficult than in previous I-sharing research where researchers 
withheld information on these other Me variables.   
One also might wonder whether my I-sharing manipulation or Me-similarity 
manipulation affected other variables such as mood, and attentiveness to one’s partner.  
Might the disagreement in the dissimilar-Me condition, or the lack of feedback in the No 
Info condition lead participants to be in a worse mood?  I ran a 2 (I-sharing condition: 
Fostered, Comparison) X 3 (Me-similarity condition: Me-similar, Me-dissimilar, No Me 
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Info) ANOVA with a one item mood question included in my manipulation checks (“I 
am in a good mood”) as the dependent variable.  No significant I-sharing main effect 
(F[1, 138] = .09, p = .76, η2= .001), or interaction effect appeared (F[2, 138] = .5, p = .61, 
η2= .007).  Results did, however, show a marginally significant effect of my Me-
similarity condition (F[2, 138] = 2.37, p = .097, η2= .03).  Bonferroni post hoc tests 
revealed a marginally significant difference between participants in the No Me Info, and 
Me-dissimilar condition (p = .09) such that Me-dissimilar participants (M = 4.72, SD = 
.83) reported being in a marginally significantly better mood than participants in the No 
Info condition (M = 4.31, SD = 1.01).   No significant differences appeared for 
participants in the Me-similar condition (M = 4.54, SD = .81) and the other two me-
similarity conditions. 
One might also wonder whether participants attended to their partner more in the 
I-sharing condition than the comparison condition.  As the researcher both told 
participants that they were not watching the same videos in the comparison condition, 
and participants could not see what the other person was watching in the comparison 
condition (and thus participants would have no reason to try to validate their experience 
through the other participant’s reaction), one would expect participants to attend to, or 
care about the other participant’s response more in the I-sharing condition than the 
comparison condition.  I ran the same 2 (I-sharing condition) X 3 (Me-similarity 
condition) ANOVA instead now with a one item attentiveness to response question (i.e., 
When watching the videos, how much did you pay attention to, or care about the other 
participant’s response) as the dependent variable.  Not surprisingly participants reported 
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paying attention to the other participant’s response marginally significantly more in the 
Fostered I-sharing condition (M = 3.55, SD = 1.8) than participants in the comparison 
condition, (M = 2.96, SD = 2.29), F(1, 138) = 3.03, p = .08, η2= .02.  No significant Me-
similarity effect (F[2, 138] = .04, p = .97, η2= .001), or interaction effect appeared (F[2, 
138] = .23, p = .8, η2= .003).    
Discussion 
 In the study presented here, participants randomly assigned to the proposed I-
sharing intervention reported more feelings of subjective similarity than participants in 
the comparison condition.  This finding suggests that experiencing novel and emotionally 
evocative stimuli that elicit predictably similar responses with another does indeed foster 
a sense of I-sharing.  A lack of interpersonal main effects, however, should temper one’s 
enthusiasm.  I did not find an overall main effect of I-sharing on liking or on the 
interpersonal behavior measures.  These findings thus only partially support my 
hypotheses that watching novel and emotionally evocative stimuli in a context where one 
can experience each other’s experience will promote both I-sharing and subsequent 
interpersonal connection.   
Although the results of this study provide some encouragement, the effect size of 
the I-sharing technique on subjective similarity was smaller than expected.  Despite 
participants in the Fostered I-sharing condition reporting significantly more perceived 
subjective similarity than participants in the comparison condition, in regards to mean 
labels the increase was only to a point of “Neither Agree Nor Disagree” in the Fostered I-
sharing condition.  This smaller than anticipated effect surely reduced the overall 
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effectiveness of the intervention.  In other words the I-sharing intervention did not 
increase perceptions of perceived subjective similarity to a level that one would expect to 
strongly influence interpersonal attraction or interpersonal behavior.  Without creating a 
situation where an individual believes another experiences the world similarly, one would 
not expect significant effects for liking or interpersonal behavior.   
The reason for this weak perceived subjective similarity effect may lie in some 
notable differences between the current study and previous experimental I-sharing 
manipulations.  For one, previous experimental manipulations controlled the information 
exchanged by having ostensible participants in separate rooms.  In the current study, 
participants had time to evaluate each other on all of the variables one can glean from 
first impressions (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993).  All of this added noise, including noise 
from how objectively similar or dissimilar participants naturally were (e.g. gender) would 
statistically make finding an effect harder due to increased standard deviations.  For 
instance results showed that in mixed gender pairs males perceived more subjective 
similarity of females than females did of males.  The added noise of all these potential 
Me factors might have lowered the effectiveness of the I-sharing manipulation as all of 
these other potentially interpersonally relevant factors might have competed for attention 
with the I-sharing manipulation.  How much participants valued of the topic they wrote 
about might have also created noise.  Controlling for how much participants valued the 
topic they wrote about as a covariate, and topic chosen as an additional fixed factor, 
however, did not alter ANOVA results.  It is definitely possible though that the added 
noise of this Me-sharing manipulation might have still interfered with greater feelings of 
 
39 
I-sharing.  The Me-sharing manipulation may have also potentially created a topic 
confound as participants in the similar-Me conditions wrote about Marijuana legalization 
and Transgender Bathroom privileges more than participants in the dissimilar-Me and No 
Me Info conditions.  Running liking analyses after removing participants who wrote 
about these topics, however, showed the same similar-Me liking results despite the loss 
of power.    
In terms of additional differences between the current study and past research, 
previous I-sharing researchers also made a concerted effort in experiments to disentangle 
I-sharing from Me-sharing by providing participants with clear I information that 
disagreed with Me-sharing information.  Experimental I-sharing manipulations provided 
written multiple-choice question feedback that made I implicating reactions 
unambiguous.  In doing so, researchers provided participants with definitive information 
that the Me-sharing information did not also correspond to similar ‘I’s.   
The I-sharing fostering technique used here (natural reactions to the videos), 
however, likely created more ambiguity of I similarity than previous manipulations.  
Individuals may not have been able to read each other’s reactions fully based solely on 
facial reactions.  On a one-item manipulation check that measured how much participants 
stated they were “able to infer the other participant’s reactions to videos,” although 
participants in the Fostered I-sharing condition reported significantly higher ability to 
infer reactions than those in the comparison condition t(142) = 4.45, p < .001, 
participants in the Fostered I-sharing condition still reported fairly low scores, with a 
mean of 3.4, an average in between labels of somewhat disagree (3) and somewhat agree 
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(4).   
The room for potential uncertainty left by the I-sharing manipulation used here 
may have created a situation where participants, instead of fully looking to the I-sharing 
manipulation for similarity information regarding the I, instead may have partially looked 
to Me-sharing information to estimate overlap of reactions.  The clear Me-sharing 
information, on a Me-sharing factor that one might expect to also predict I-sharing 
(values), may have in some ways overshadowed the I-sharing manipulation in regards to 
predicting subjective similarity.  Partially in line with this, results showed that the Me-
sharing manipulation did indeed influence feelings of subjective similarity as well.   
In addition, the potential ambiguity of responses in the I-sharing manipulation 
may have led certain individuals – i.e., individuals high in existential isolation – to not 
make the connection that they experienced the short films similarly when in fact they did.  
Indeed, other data suggest that existentially isolated individuals assume that other 
individuals whom they just met, experience, and will experience, stimuli differently 
(Huneke & Pinel, in prep; Pinel, Johnson, & Long 2017).  Existentially isolated 
individuals in the current study might have witnessed the ambiguous reaction cues and 
assumed that the other person experienced the short films differently.  Existentially 
isolated individuals would then have concluded that the other person did not experience 
the videos similarly to them.  When looking at the effect of the I-sharing manipulation 
across levels of existential isolation, I found participants lower in existential isolation 
showed subjective similarity effects of watching together, but more existentially isolated 
participants showed no effects.  In experimental I-sharing research, where researchers 
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made subjective agreement largely undeniable, existentially isolated participants liked I-
sharers the most (see Pinel et al., 2006; Pinel & Long, 2012).  As I-sharing helps to 
combat existential isolation, one would likewise expect an I-sharing facilitating technique 
to help existentially isolated individuals overcome their feelings of isolation, and thus 
expect existentially isolated individuals to show the largest effects of an I-sharing 
fostering technique. The lack of success in producing feelings of I-sharing specifically in 
existentially isolated individuals in the current study surely diminished the overall impact 
of the intervention.  Future researchers should aim to remove the uncertainty involved in 
the subjective experiences to help further facilitate I-sharing in existentially isolated 
individuals.    
 Talking after watching the videos may represent one means of increasing 
participants’ certainty that they did indeed I-share.  To pilot test this possibility, I had a 
group of sixteen participants undergo the same procedure as those in my Fostered I-
Sharing/Me-Similarity condition, with one exception.  These pilot participants received 5 
minutes to talk with one another after they watched the videos.  In this condition, 
participants liked their partner significantly more than did participants in the Me-
similarity conditions described in the current paper.  When examining the results with 
existential isolation as a moderator, I found these effects happened across levels of 
existential isolation, suggesting talking may potentially make the other person’s 
experience less ambiguous.  Importantly mediation analyses showed that perceived 
subjective similarity, controlling for objective similarity, strongly mediated the liking 
effect (with neither a 10000 sample bootstrapped confidence interval, nor a Preacher and 
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Kelly Kappa-squared CI that crosses zero, and the vast majority the effect of talking 
condition on liking explained by the indirect effect).  Future research should further test 
such an intervention with a suitable talking control condition to further verify that such an 
effect stems from participants confirming their subjective agreement, rather than simply 
because talking in general improves interpersonal connection.   
 A second way of increasing participants’ certainty that they are experiencing 
stimuli identically to their interaction partner would be to have participants answer 
multiple choice or yes/no reaction questions that individuals largely react similarly to 
after watching the videos.  Similar to the manipulations used in past I-sharing research, 
participants could then switch answers, this time the answers being their actual answers 
rather than the fake computer generated ones previous experimenters used to manipulate 
I-sharing.  Future research testing both of these forms of reducing reaction ambiguity 
could greatly improve the intervention. 
In terms of other notable results, although the I-sharing manipulation did not 
overall affect interpersonal attraction and behavior, I did, however, find a significant 
effect of the I-sharing intervention on liking, and a marginally significant effect of it on 
interpersonal behavior measures for participants in the similar-Me condition.  I did not 
find a significant interaction, so one certainly could not come to the full conclusion that 
the effectiveness of the I-sharing manipulation depends on level of Me-sharing.   An I-
sharing manipulation that produced a larger effect, however, might show such an 
interaction effect.  As referenced earlier, providing unambiguous feedback would be one 
way to increase the power of the I-sharing manipulation.  With a more powerful 
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manipulation one would be able to examine whether an interaction effect really does 
exist, or whether I-sharing increases interpersonal attraction and behavior across all levels 
of Me-similarity.  Given the lack of an interaction effect, I thus only very loosely 
speculate as to why this Me-similarity (value agreement) might positively affect the 
interpersonal effectiveness of the I-sharing intervention.  I provide three possible reasons 
why I potentially found I-sharing effects only in the Me-similarity condition below.First 
it could be the case that similarity on one aspect of the self might help to reaffirm the 
potential feelings of liking from similarity on the other aspect of the self.  Thus Me-
sharing might confirm one’s liking inclinations after one has I-shared, and vice versa.   
Second, participants in the similar-Me condition may have felt more comfortable 
examining each other’s reactions, and so they might have picked up on more cues of 
subjective agreement in the Fostered I-shared condition.  As referenced in the 
introduction, research suggests that individuals avoid sharing subjective experiences 
(Long, 2007), or opinions (Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005) with people 
they dislike.  This effect may extend to people they lack information on, and thus 
individuals might have avoided even examining the reactions of the other participant in 
both of the non-agreement conditions.  Unlike participants who did not receive any 
feedback, or participants who disagreed, participants in the similar-Me condition might 
have felt comfortable enough to examine each other’s reactions.  When given the 
opportunity to pick up on them in the Fostered I-sharing condition, participants with 
similar-Mes would then potentially have witnessed the similar reactions thereby 
improving interpersonal connection.   
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Lastly, I might have only found significant interpersonal results only in the 
similar-Me condition because individuals in the similar Me condition may have also felt 
more confident interpreting the other participants’ reactions to the videos in the Fostered 
I-sharing condition as similar to their own.  The previous value agreement (an aspect of 
the Me that might predict future I-sharing) could have made participants more certain that 
similar, but potentially ambiguous, subjective reactions really did entail I-sharing.  As 
Me-sharing can also sometimes influence perceived subjective similarity (Marcus, 
Sakamoto, Virmani, & Pinel, 2013) and results showed the value-related Me-sharing 
manipulation I used in this study also influenced perceptions of subjective similarity, this 
value information may have also affected conclusions of I-sharing.   
The interpersonal connection effects of the I-sharing intervention in the Me-
Similarity condition may have some potential implications for individuals seeking to 
facilitate better relationships between individuals using I-sharing.  Similarity in aspects of 
the Me that also strongly influence perceptions of subjective similarity (such as value 
agreement) may enhance the effectiveness of subsequent I-sharing, thereby helping to 
connect individuals.  Despite I-sharing’s proven interpersonal power, to harness it most 
effectively to bring individuals with value disagreements together (such as a staunch 
Democrat and ardent Republican), these results suggest one may both want to initially 
focus the individuals on an area of value agreement before experiencing stimuli together, 
and also make the subsequent subjective similarities undeniable.  Therapists looking to 
use I-sharing to help couples reconnect (see Pinel, Bernecker, & Rampy, 2015) may 
similarly want to have clients initially discuss a topic of value agreement before utilizing 
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any I-sharing intervention.  The investigation of whether, and under what contexts, an 
initial focus on shared values might improve any I-sharing intervention’s efficacy 
definitely warrants further study. 
In addition, researchers may want to investigate the effectiveness of other Me-
sharing manipulations in facilitating I-sharing.  Initial use of other Me-similarity 
manipulations that might even more strongly predict the I, such as preferences for 
specific political candidates or movies, might further feelings of subjective overlap and 
improve the effectiveness of an I-sharing manipulation.  If I-sharing and Me-sharing 
might synergistically affect I-sharing, one may thus want to investigate the effectiveness 
of potentially improving I-sharing using a Me-similarity manipulation that might further 
implicate the I.   In regards to overcoming Me differences, it is also possible that an I-
sharing intervention may be more effective regarding overcoming less I-implicating Me 
differences (such as race) than more I-implicating Me differences (such as culture or 
religion).  Research further examining the relationship between the Me and I could bear 
fruit. 
Like all studies, this study is not, however, without its limitations.  Although I 
included the No Me Information condition as a pseudo control condition for the Me-
sharing manipulation, the lack of any information may have negatively influenced 
participants as well.  Theory and research suggests that individuals have a desire to match 
their opinions with others (Hardin & Higgins, 1996).  In the No Me Information 
condition I had individuals write an essay on an important topic, but I provided no 
opportunity to discuss their beliefs with others and make efforts to “share reality” in this 
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way.  This may have left participants less enthused about the other participant, or in a 
worse mood, compared to if they read the other participant’s essay, perhaps influencing 
interpersonal results.  When I examined a one-item mood question placed at the end of 
the experiment (“I am in a good mood”) by agreement condition, I found that participants 
in the No Info condition reported marginally significantly less agreement with the good 
mood question than those in the dissimilar-Me condition.  Complete lack of any feedback 
from others may have also made participants who also did not watch the videos together 
yearn for feedback, including perhaps feedback from talking with the other participant.  
Perhaps this contributed to why participants who received no feedback on the value 
essays, and who watched the videos separately, unexpectedly allocated, on average, a 
large number of minutes to talking despite not displaying other interpersonal connection 
effects.   
Another limitation might lie in that the experiment also immediately began when 
the second participant arrived, so the participants did not have a chance to interact at all.  
As discussed before, one might feel uncomfortable examining the experiences of 
complete strangers with whom one has not interacted.  Having a short introductory period 
may enhance the effects of the I-sharing manipulation across all conditions.  When using 
such an intervention with couples one may not need this, but when used with strangers it 
could make the difference between a made or missed I-sharing connection.   
Society would also benefit from further testing of I-sharing manipulations with 
couples.   If couples already have a certain comfort level, then they might more readily 
pick up on moments of I-sharing.  Couples may, however, have more fixed conclusions 
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about subjective similarity, and thus an intervention might not alter subjective similarity 
feelings as much as it might with strangers.  Testing of future interventions with couples 
would help to answer some of these questions.   
The fact that females also comprised a large subset of my sample represents 
another limitation.  As research suggests that on average females pick up on emotional 
cues more easily than men do (see Collignon, Girard, Gosselin, Saint-Amour, Lepore, & 
Lassonde, 2010), and express emotions more often (Jansz, 2000; Kring & Gordon, 1998), 
it is possible that the I-sharing intervention without any modifications would be less 
effective in the general population than with the sample I procured.  Results of gender 
analyses, however, did not support such an interpretation.  The I-sharing intervention did 
not affect female-female dyads more than dyads that included a male.  In addition, similar 
mean differences between the I-sharing and comparison condition occurred for both 
males and females in the mixed-dyad pairs.  If gender differences on emotional 
expressiveness and non-verbal emotional intelligence did, however, affect the 
effectiveness of the I-sharing intervention despite the lack of results, then the previously 
mentioned verbal means of improving knowledge of the other’s subjective experience 
(talking and the reaction questionnaire) should also counteract some of these potential 
advantages females might possess.   
Another limitation lies in that my sample was also largely Caucasian (91.7% 
identified as white).  When removing the noise of race and analyzing only same race 
dyads the same pattern of results as I reported earlier appeared.  A problem with external 
validity might exist though.  With the low numbers of minorities in my study, the results 
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might not extend across race.  Future I-sharing intervention researchers should examine 
any I-sharing manipulation in a more racially diverse sample. 
A final potential limitation lies in the I-sharing manipulation.  Although the pilot 
study showed that individuals shared similar reactions to the stimuli, two of the short 
videos (Jinxy Jenkins & Lucky Lou and the Piano) provoked more similar reactions in 
participants than did the third (Chateau de Sable).  Future researchers may want to 
investigate whether removing or replacing Chateau de Sable improves the efficacy of the 
manipulation.  Removing the video would further improve the practicality of the 
manipulation by reducing the video timing in half (as Chateau de Sable lasted longer than 
the other two).   
Conclusions 
In the I-sharing intervention tested here, having participants watch novel and 
emotionally evocative videos that produce predictable responses in a context where they 
could experience each other’s experience increased participants’ I-sharing beliefs.  For 
participants made to know of a value agreement, it also positively influenced 
interpersonal connection.  Although practical due to the brief nature of the intervention 
and ease of setup, the intervention did not, however, demonstrate an ability to counteract 
negative forces (such as value disagreements) that work against connections in the real-
world.  Future I-sharing intervention researchers should continue to test whether an even 
more powerful I-sharing intervention might help to bridge some of these divides.  When 
creating future I-sharing interventions researchers should learn from the current study and 
reduce the ambiguity of subjective responses.  This study, however, provided an 
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important first step in creating a means of taking advantage of the benefits of I-sharing.  
In a world ripe for applications of I-sharing, the intervention represents a promising, but 























Allport, G. W. (1979). The nature of prejudice. Basic books. 
Ambady, N., & Rosenthal, R. (1993). Half a minute: Predicting teacher evaluations from 
thin slices of nonverbal behavior and physical attractiveness. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 64(3), 431. 
Aron, A., Aron E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of other in the self scale and the 
structure of interpersonal closeness. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 63, 596-612.  
Aron, A., Norman, C. C., Aron, E. N., McKenna, C., & Heyman, R. E. (2000). Couples' 
shared participation in novel and arousing activities and experienced relationship 
quality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(2), 273. 
Bien, T. H., Miller, W. R., & Tonigan, J. S. (1993). Brief interventions for alcohol 
problems: A review. Addiction, 88(3), 315–336. 
Bradley, M. M., Greenwald, M. K., Petry, M. C. & Lang, P. J. (1992).  Remembering 
pictures: Pleasure and arousal in memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 18, 379−390.  
Brosch, T., Pourtois, G., & Sander, D. (2010).  The perception and categorisation of 
emotional stimuli: A review.  Cognition & Emotion, 24(3), 377-400. 
doi:10.1080/02699930902975754 
Campbell, S. W. (2006). Perceptions of mobile phones in college classrooms: Ringing, 
cheating, and classroom policies. Communication education, 55(3), 280-294.  
Collignon, O., Girard, S., Gosselin, F., Saint-Amour, D., Lepore, F., & Lassonde, M. 
(2010). Women process multisensory emotion expressions more efficiently than 
men. Neuropsychologia, 48(1), 220-225. 
Fasel, B., & Luettin, J. (2003). Automatic facial expression analysis: a survey. Pattern 
recognition, 36(1), 259-275. 
Gaither, S. E., Remedios, J. D., Schultz, J. R., Maddox, K. B., & Sommers, S. R. (2016). 
Examining the effects of I-Sharing for future white-black interactions. Social 
Psychology 47, 125-135. 
Greenlee, G. (2008).  Postcards and pearls: Life lessons from solo moments on the road.  
Aventine Press. 
Hamann, S. B., Ely, T. D., Grafton, S. T., & Kilts, C. D. (1999). Amygdala activity 
related to enhanced memory for pleasant and aversive stimuli.  Nature 
neuroscience, 2(3), 289-293. 
Hartikainen, K. M., Ogawa, K. H., Soltani, M., & Knight, R. T. (2007). Emotionally 
arousing stimuli compete for attention with left hemispace. Neuroreport, 18(18), 
1929-1933.  
Hayes, A. F. (2013).  Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process 
analysis. New York: The Guilford Press.  
Herman, K. C., Reinke, W. M., Frey, A., & Shepard, S. (2013). Motivational 
interviewing in schools: Strategies for engaging parents, teachers, and students. 
Springer Publishing Company. 
Huneke, M., & Pinel, E. C. (2016). Fostering selflessness through I-sharing. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 63, 10-18. 
 
51 
James, W. (1890/1918). Principles of psychology. Toronto: General Publishing 
Company. 
Jansz, J (2000). Masculine identity and restrictive emotionality. Gender and emotion: 
Social psychological perspectives: 166–186. 
Johnston, William A.; Hawley, Kevin J.; Plewe, Steven H.; Elliott, John M. G.; DeWitt, 
M. Jann (1990).  Attention capture by novel stimuli. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 119(4), 397-411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-
3445.119.4.397  
Kring, A. M., & Gordon, A. H. (1998). Sex differences in emotion: Expression, 
experience, and physiology. Journal of personality and social psychology, 74(3), 
686-703. 
LaMorte (2016).  Retrieved from http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/mph-
modules/bs/bs704_nonparametric/bs704_nonparametric2.html 
Loftus, E. F. (1980). Memory.  Reading, MA.; Addison-Wesley. 
Long, A. E. (2007).  Seeking and avoiding I contact: When subjective overlap appeals 
and when it repels. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences 
and Engineering, 3450. 
Perez, F..  Quote found at: http://www.azquotes.com/quote/1452702 
Pinel, E. C. (2011).  I-sharing and prosocial harmony.  National Science Foundation 
Grant. 
Pinel, E. C., Bernecker, S. L., & Rampy, N. M. (2015).  I-Sharing on the couch: On the 
clinical implications of shared subjective experience.  Journal of Psychotherapy 
Integration.  25(2), 59. 
Pinel, Johnson, & Long, (2017).  Manuscript in preparation.   
Pinel, E. C., & Long, A. E. (2012). When I’s meet: Sharing subjective experience with 
someone from the outgroup. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(3), 
296-307. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167211433878 
Pinel, E. C., Long, A. E., & Crimin, L. A. (2008). We're warmer (they're more 
competent): I-sharing and African-American's perceptions of the in-group and 
out-group. European Journal of Social Psychology, 38(7), 1184-1192. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.562 
Pinel, E. C., Long, A. E., & Crimin, L. A. (2010). I-sharing and a classic conformity 
paradigm. Social Cognition, 28(3), 277-289. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.2010.28.3.277 
Pinel, E.C., Long, A., Landau, M., Alexander, K., & Pyszczynski, T. (2006). Seeing I to 
I: A path to interpersonal connectedness. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 90(2), 243-257. 
Pinel, E.C., Long, A., Landau, M.J, & Pyszczynski, T. (2004). I-Sharing, the problem of 
existential isolation, and their implications for interpersonal and intergroup 
phenomena. In J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, L. Sander, & T. Pyszczynski (Eds), 
Handbook of Experimental Existential Psychology (pp. 352-368). New York, NY, 
US: Guilford Press. 
Pinel, E.C., Long, A., Brenna, B., Rampy, N., & Finnell, S. (2016).  Human like me: I-
sharing humanizes the otherwise infrahumanized.  Manuscript under review. 
Pinel, E. C., Long, A. E., Murdoch, E. Q., & Helm, P. (2017). A prisoner of one's own 
 
52 
mind: Identifying and understanding existential isolation. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 105, 54-63. 
Pinel, Yawger, Long, Brenna, Rampy, & Finnell, (2017, Under Revision at the British 
Journal of Social Psychology). 
Rankin, C. H., Abrams, T., Barry, R. J., Bhatnagar, S., Clayton, D., Colombo, J., … 
Thompson, R. F. (2009). Habituation Revisited: An Updated and Revised 
Description of the Behavioral Characteristics of Habituation. Neurobiology of 
Learning and Memory, 92(2), 135–138. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlm.2008.09.012 
Pinel, E. C., Long, A. E., & Huneke, M. (2015). In the Blink of an I: On Delayed but 
Identical Subjective Reactions and Their Effect on Self-Interested Behavior. The 
Journal of social psychology, 155(6), 605-616. 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect 
effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & 
Computers, 36(4), 717-731. 
PROPHET (1997).  Retrieved from: 
http://www.basic.northwestern.edu/statguidefiles/linreg_ass_viol.html 
Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). Intergroup 
conflict and cooperation: The Robbers Cave experiment (Vol. 10). Norman, OK: 
University Book Exchange. 
Yalom, I. (1980).  Existential psychotherapy.  New York: Basic Books. 
Zajonc, R. B., (1968).  Attitudinal effects of mere exposure.  Journal of Personality and 




















   















Table 1.  Means for all dependent measures by condition  
 Me-Condition  
 No Info Dissimilar Similar Total 
Subjective similarity     
    I-sharing 3.85 (.63) 3.74 (.79) 3.87 (.79) 3.82 (.74) 
   Comparison 3.68 (.83) 3.13 (1.03) 3.72 (.61) 3.52 (.87) 
   Total 3.77 (.73) 3.45 (.95) 3.8 (.71) 3.67 (.81) 
Liking (Summed)     
    I-sharing 7.76 (1.12) 7.31 (.9) 8.04 (.66) 7.71 (.93) 
   Comparison 7.64 (1.1) 7.2 (1.34) 7.47 (.56) 7.44 (1.03) 
   Total 7.7 (1.08) 7.25 (1.11) 7.77 (.67) 7.58 (.98) 
% giving phone number     
    I-sharing 58.33% 79.17% 84.61% 74.32% 
   Comparison 66.66% 63.64% 62.5% 64.29% 
   Total 62.5% 71.74% 74% 69.44% 
Minutes allocated for talking     
    I-sharing 4.79 (2.13) 5.67 (3.32) 6.04 (1.9) 5.51 (2.53) 
   Comparison 6.17 (3.13) 4.86 (2.93) 5.33 (2.37) 5.47 (2.84) 
    Total 5.48 (2.74) 5.28 (3.13) 5.7 (2.15) 5.49 (2.68) 
Objective similarity     
   I-sharing 4.21 (.86) 3.84 (1.06) 4.26 (.68) 4.11 (.88) 
   Comparison 4.23 (.86) 3.17 (1.02) 4.14 (.61) 3.86 (.96) 
   Total 4.22 (.85) 3.52 (1.09) 4.2 (.64) 3.99 (.92) 
Existential Isolation     
   I-sharing 3.63 (.87) 3.49 (.64) 3.41 (.78) 3.51 (.77) 
   Comparison 3.56 (1.01) 3.5 (.74) 3.43 (.55) 3.5 (.78) 
   Total 3.59 (.93) 3.49 (.68) 3.42 (.68) 3.5 (.77) 
Self-other overlap     
   I-sharing 2.5 (1.29) 2.13 (.99) 2.5 (1.14) 2.38 (1.14) 
   Comparison 2.33 (1.55) 1.82 (.85) 2.29 (1.23) 2.16 (1.26) 




   
Figure 1: Conditional Effect of the I-sharing Manipulation on Perceived Subjective 
















I believe that doctor’s __________ be allowed to assist terminally ill patients in severe 
pain with suicide. 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
Should Not                                                                           Should 
I believe that buying and wearing animal fur _________ be made illegal. 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
Should Not                                                                            Should 
I believe that second trimester abortions (after the first three months) _____________ be 
legal. 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
Should Not                                                                        Should 
I believe that individuals who enter this country illegally _____________ be deported 
back to their home countries. 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
Should Not                                                                          Should 
I believe that Marijuana ________________ be made legal in all 50 states. 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
Should Not                                                                           Should 
I believe if a person now identifies as the opposite sex to what they were originally born 








In the space below please write a paragraph discussing your opinion on the topic that the 




















Jinxy Jenkins & Lucky Lou-  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6xb5PuG0f0 
 
Chateau de Sable - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYRu6MwmFYE 
 




  Strongly        Disagree       Somewhat          Neither     Somewhat      Agree        Strongly 
      Disagree              Disagree           Agree          Agree                             Agree 
Nor Disagree 
The other participant and I experience stimuli similarly. 
The other participant and I see eye to eye when it comes to how we experience 
things. 
The other participant and I differ quite a bit in our experiences of things. 











  Strongly        Disagree       Somewhat          Neither     Somewhat      Agree        Strongly 
      Disagree              Disagree           Agree          Agree                             Agree 
Nor Disagree 
 
I believe the other participant and I potentially come from similar backgrounds. 
The other participant and I likely ascribe to the same groups. 
The other participant and I likely have similar beliefs. 
The other participant and I do not likely ascribe to the same groups. 
 
 
Appendix F (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) 
Instructions: Please select the picture that best describes your current relationship with 








Liking Questionnaire (first six items) (adapted from Pinel and Long, 2012b)  
 
1--------------2--------------3--------------4--------------5--------------6 
            Strongly        Disagree      Somewhat      Somewhat   Agree        Strongly 
      Disagree                 Disagree            Agree                             Agree 
 
1. I like the other participant. 
2. I feel close to the other participant. 
3. I could imagine becoming friends with the other participant. 
4. I would want the other participant as a coworker. 
5. I would potentially look forward to hanging out with the other 
participant in the future. 
6. I feel positively about the other participant. 
7. If the other participant needed help I would give it. 
8. If I needed help the other participant would give it. 
9. How similar do you feel your partner is to you? 
0----------1-----------2---------3----------4------------5-----------6-----------7-----------8--------9 




The remaining 12 minutes of the study will consist of talking with the other participant, 
and surfing the internet on your own.  Of the remaining 12 minutes of the study how 
many would you like to allot to surfing the internet? 
______ 










1. What is your age? 
2. What is your gender? 1=female 2=male 3=transgender 
female   4=transgender male 5=other 
3. Are you Hispanic or Latino?  1=Yes  2=No 
4. What races apply to you from the following choices? (select all that 
apply)  
1=Black or African American 2=White  3=Asian 










Existential Isolation Questionnaire 
 
1--------------2--------------3--------------4--------------5--------------6--------------7 
            Strongly    Neutral    Strongly 
          Disagree                                      Agree 
 
 
1. I usually feel like people share my outlook on life. 
 
2. I often have the same reactions to things that other people around me do. 
 
3. People around me tend to react to things in our environment the same way I do. 
 
4. People do not often share my perspective. 
 
5. Other people usually do not understand my experiences. 
 















            Strongly        Disagree      Somewhat      Somewhat   Agree        Strongly 
      Disagree                 Disagree            Agree                             Agree 
 
I knew how the other participant felt about particular scenes in the movies he or 
she was watching: 
 
1--------------2--------------3--------------4--------------5--------------6 
            Strongly        Disagree      Somewhat      Somewhat   Agree        Strongly 
      Disagree                 Disagree            Agree                             Agree 
 
Did you and the other participant watch the same or different videos? 
 
A.  The Same 
B. Different 
 





I value the topic that I wrote about: 
 
1--------------2--------------3--------------4--------------5--------------6 
            Strongly        Disagree      Somewhat      Somewhat   Agree        Strongly 
      Disagree                 Disagree            Agree                             Agree 
 
When watching the videos, how much did you pay attention to, or care about the 
other participant’s response 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
                Not at All      A lot 
 





            Strongly        Disagree      Somewhat      Somewhat   Agree        Strongly 
      Disagree                 Disagree            Agree                             Agree 
 
The Piano video was emotionally evocative… 
 
1--------------2--------------3--------------4--------------5--------------6 
            Strongly        Disagree      Somewhat      Somewhat   Agree        Strongly 
      Disagree                 Disagree            Agree                             Agree 
 
The Jinxy Jenkins and Lucky Lou video was emotionally evocative… 
 
1--------------2--------------3--------------4--------------5--------------6 
            Strongly        Disagree      Somewhat      Somewhat   Agree        Strongly 
      Disagree                 Disagree            Agree                             Agree 
 















I am in a good mood. 
 
 1--------------2--------------3--------------4--------------5--------------6 
            Strongly        Disagree      Somewhat      Somewhat   Agree        Strongly 
      Disagree                 Disagree            Agree                             Agree 
